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ABSTRACT 
Energy consumption induces climate change but at the same time modifications in 
climate impact the energy sector both in terms of supply capacity and shift in energy 
demand. Different regions will be affected in different ways and this paper aims at 
analysing the issue at the European level. Usually rising sea levels, extremes of weather 
and an increase in the frequency of droughts and floods are indicated to play havoc with 
the world's energy systems but they can be hardly estimated and this study will be limited 
to the effects of the increase in average temperature. Tipping points are also taken out of 
any quantitative assessment. Structure of the EU energy budget is presented, shifts in 
energy demand, vulnerabilities of supply and risks for energy infrastructure are discussed 
in order to eventually provide figures of possible further threats to the continental energy 
security.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The relation between energy and climate change is usually debated in terms of how 
emissions from energy consumption induces alterations in the planet’s equilibrium. 
Indeed, there also exists the issue of how modification of climate impacts the energy 
sector both in terms of supply capacity and shift in consumption trends.  
Assessment of this relation is challenging because reliable forecasts of future climate 
meet with intrinsic difficulties. First of all, the low predictability of climate as a whole [1] 
affects the capabilities of making guesses in specific sectors like energy. Second, all 
forecasts are made under the assumption, reasonable but not certain, that no tipping 
points [2] will be trespassed. Finally, a shared view among the scholars is that climate 
will show a double face: the mean, whose effects will be related to the increase of the 
mean temperature, and the extreme, whose effects come from the increase in frequency 
and intensity of extreme events. While effects from the increase of the mean temperature 
are forecasted with a certain degree of confidence, those from extremes are definitely 
more difficult to predict. Several studies have been carried out on vulnerabilities of 
energy supply and new trends in consumption both at global [3] and regional [4] level and 
an extensive US National Climate Assessment [5] has been carried out to specifically 
address the issue. Nevertheless, because the exact extension of climate change is still 
indefinite, its effect on the energy sector remains vague. In fact greater uncertainty is on 
supply and production, affected by extreme weather events, than on energy demand, 
driven mainly by the increase in mean temperature. Because of this incertitude, most of 
the literature [6] provides just lists of qualitative trends rather than quantitative 
evaluations. This paper aims at making a more detailed analysis at European level of the 
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consequences on the EU 27 energy budget and at investigating the exact extent of a 
possible energy security issue. The analysis is carried out in a +2 °C scenario seen 
acceptable at the 2010 UNFCCC Cancun Conference even if a recent study suggests this 
could be accompanied by a significantly changed climate from today, for example in 
terms of precipitation [7]. In this study will be taken into account only direct effects on 
energy systems from increase of temperature while indirect effects, like those coming 
from changes in ecosystems, will be taken out.   
STRUCTURE OF EU ENERGY BALANCE 
The issue of the energy security, i.e. a possible imbalance between supply and 
demand, may occur at different time and spatial scales. In this study the focus will be at 
the level of the annual energy balance. Table 1 shows a condensed version of the EU 27 
energy balance for the year 2010 [8] and Figure 1 provides a pictorial view of the same 
information. The way it is organised is similar to the usual energy balance at national 
level and contains three sections: 
 Supply of primary energy, made by adding up flows of energy entering the 
continental territory (production and imports) and subtracting flows of energy 
made unavailable for continental consumption (exports, international bunkers, 
etc.); 
 Transformation + energy industry use + losses, which covers those activities that 
transform the original primary (and sometimes secondary) commodity into a form 
which is better suited for specific uses and ready for the final consumption; 
 Final energy consumption, obtained by summing up energy spent in industry, 
residential, services, public administration, transport and so on. 
It is worth noting that from 1,759 Mtoe of primary energy, only 1,152 Mtoe become 
available for final consumption.  
The structure could be seen as a matrix whose elements are supply, transformation 
and consumption vs source types. Climate change impacts each element of the matrix 
forcing energy needs to evolve. The result will be a new matrix with possible gaps 




Figure 1. Pictorial view of the EU 27 energy balance year 2010 (Elaboration of Eurostat data) 
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Table 1. A condensed version of EU 27 energy balance year 2010 (Elaboration of Eurostat data) 
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SHIFTS IN ENERGY DEMAND 
Comprehensive lists of general trends in energy demand driven by climate changes 
are available in the literature [5]. Certain areas which are expected to play a major role are 
listed in Table 2.  
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Climate change could trigger several drivers of modification. First is the higher mean 
temperature in itself. Breakdown of EU 27 energy consumption shows that industry, 
transport and residential sectors take about 90% of the share (see Figure 2). Literature and 
simulations predict that consumption for transport and industry will be affected little or 
not at all by increase of temperature. IPCC in 2007 in its Fourth Assessment Report states 
that: “…Climate-change vulnerabilities of industry, settlement and society are mainly 
related to extreme weather events rather than to gradual climate change (very high 
confidence)…” [9] and again in 2011: “…Although the energy, industry, and 
transportation sectors are of great economic importance, the climate sensitivity of most 
activities is low relative to that of agriculture and natural ecosystems, while the capacity 
for autonomous adaptation is high, as long as climate change takes place gradually [10].  
 
 
Figure 2. Breakdown of EU 28 energy consumption years 1990-2012 (Elaboration of Eurostat 
data) 
Data on European energy consumption are in agreement with these statements. Figure 
3 shows Heating Degree Days (HDD) and energy consumption for industry, 





Figure 3. Heating Degree Days (HDD) vs. energy consumption in industry, transportation and 
residential (households + services) in EU 27, years 1990-2012 (Elaboration of Eurostat data) 
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At a glance, it appears that industry and transportation are quite independent from 
HDD while residential sector shows a different behaviour. In fact, calculations give a 
correlation factor between HDD and industry consumption or HDD vs. transportation is 
equal to -0.20 while a significant 0.45 between HDD and residential indicates a much 
stronger relation between climate and consumption in residential sector. 
Because industry and transportation sectors represent about 2/3 of energy demand, it 
appears that the same ratio could be considered climate independent (see Figure 4) and 
does not entail, from this point of view, issues of energy security. In fact, a warmer world 
will demand less space heating and more energy for space cooling in summer. Usually 
these shifts are expressed in HDD and CDD (Cooling Degree Days). In EU-27 in the 
period 1980-2009 the number of HDD has decreased by 13% [11], yet with substantial 
inter-annual variation. The pattern shows that the decrease has not been homogeneous 
across Europe and the absolute decrease has been largest in the cool regions in northern 
Europe where heating demand is highest. Other studies calculate a 10% reduction of 
HDD for most locations in Europe [12] under the assumption of a temperature increase of 
1 K in winter. In this paper the effect on energy demand for heating is assumed to be in 
linear relation with HDD and expressed as [13] 
 
(Residential & Services heating)acc = (Residential & Services heating)bcc × 
_HDDacc / HDDbcc 
(1) 
 
Acc and bcc stand for “after” and “before climate change”. The exact value for bcc 
depends on which year is taken as reference, while acc depends on model, year and 
selected future scenario. The same reasoning applies to CDD that are expected to 
increase. Several scholars [14] suggest that the worldwide energy demand for cooling 
will increase not only to face higher summer temperature but also the increase of cooled 
surface. Because this is going to happen mostly in non OECD countries, will not be 
considered in this study on European trends.  
 
  
Figure 4. Breakdown of EU27 2010 energy balance in climate sensitive areas (Eurostat data) 
Because the EU27 buildings use 23% of the primary energy supply [15] and almost 
40% of total final energy consumption [16] is for heating, a possible decrease from 10 to 
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This must be compared with the effect of increase in CDD to have a figure of the net 
saving. It’s useful to remind that surface cooling is done through electric devices and 
electricity accounts for about 20% of the total EU 27 energy consumption. A breakdown 
of electricity consumption (see Figure 5) shows that residential + services take together a 
share of 60% but not more than 5% is used for air conditioning. In Figure 5 this is shown 
only for services but this applies also to residential [17]. All together the net result is that 
surface cooling takes about 1% [20% (electricity share of total energy consumption) × 
60% (services-residential share) × 5% (air conditioning share)] of total energy 
consumption. A 65% (Table 3) increase in CDD could even double this figure but in the 
overall budget, it appears largely offset by the savings from the reduction of HDD. 
Beside the increase of the average temperature, climate models predict that local peaks in 
summer temperatures will be much more frequent and more pronounced in absolute 
value. This does not entail shortage of energy per se but, because the total installed power 
is tailored on peaks of electricity demand, more robust interconnections in and among 
regions and possible re-sizing of power plant parks will be needed. 
Agriculture appears in Table 2 since water scarcity could exacerbate the need of 
energy for irrigation and increase the total demand in critical summers. In fact, climatic 
variables, such as temperature and precipitation, are essential inputs to agricultural 
production and different combinations and seasonal patterns have a direct consequence 
on yields. That said, agriculture accounts only for about 1% (see Table 1) of total 
electricity consumption. 
In summary, only households and services consumption appear to be climate 
sensitive producing a combined effect, in a +2 °C scenario, of a possible reduction of 6% 




Figure 5. Breakdown of electricity consumption in EU 27, year 2010 (JRC elaboration of 
Eurostat data) 
VULNERABILITIES IN ENERGY SUPPLY 
The future of energy supply is much more difficult to predict. Table 4 summarises 
how this sector could be hit by climate change. It appears that supply based on fossils 
could be affected in several ways. First in the table are extreme weather events. Type, 
frequency and intensity of these extremes vary region by region [18] and this raises 
concerns about energy infrastructures which were built to meet climate conditions of the 
past and there is no reason to believe that they will meet future conditions. However, 
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there are claims that off-shore gas/oil platforms already today usually operate within 
extreme weather conditions [19]. Whatever the real resilience is, the only answer to 
extremes will be adaptation. 
This is different from water scarcity, second in the table and most likely a more 
compelling concern, where proactive initiatives can be put in place in advance. Today, 
United States and Europe produce 91% and 78% of their total electricity by 
thermoelectric (nuclear and fossil-fuelled) power plants [20], which directly depend for 
cooling on the availability and temperature of water resources. This makes the supply of 
electricity vulnerable to the combined impacts of lower summer river flows and higher 
river water temperatures. In fact, even when cooling water is available, its temperature is 
expected to rise [20] and plant efficiency to decline. In particular, for 1 °C increase in air 
temperature, the power output of natural gas-fired combustion turbines (often used for 
peaking) is estimated to decrease by approximately 0.6% – 0.7% [21]. In the same 
condition, nuclear power plants, output losses are estimated to be approximately 0.5% 
[22] [23]. A further difficulty is that electricity generation, in case of drought, goes in 
fierce competition with agriculture. This is not listed in Table 3 because it does not 
directly affect the level of energy supply but could occasionally force to stop or reduce 
plants operation in case agriculture needs have a higher priority compared with energy 
production. In order to simplify our scheme, a 0.5% decrease of efficiency per °C will 
assumed in all thermo/nuclear power plants. 
 
Table 3. Trends in energy supply driven by climate change 
 
Driver Supply decrease 
Supply 
increase 
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 The situation with renewables is much patchier. The previously mentioned US draft 
Climate Assessment contains a table of Challenges in energy supply (page 181) [5] and in 
the column “Solar PV Wind”, any quantification of trends is dropped by the following 
comment: “Impacts projected but not well defined at this time”. This sort of difficulty 
comes as no surprise because estimates of renewables productivity strongly depend on 
local conditions and therefore detailed knowledge of geographical patterns of future 
climate are needed before any assessment [4]. Concerns about the productivity of 
renewables are legitimate but there are two big pros to be taken into account: they are 
almost all immune from water scarcity and solar power, in particular, is available when it 
is needed most - during peak demand hours. 
Last but not least, vulnerability is fed also by the uncertainty of the supply of imported 
fuel. Changes in climate could spare some countries and heavily hit others in terms of 
resource endowment. In the latter case, if the affected country is an exporter, the importer 
could also experience a shortage of fuel. 
Beyond mining and production operations, the effects of peculiar weather conditions 
could jeopardise the energy supply sector in other ways like the transmission 
infrastructure. Moreover, electricity outages could have widespread effects as electric 
powered instrumentation, compression pumps and processing equipment are essential 
links in the process of creating and moving gas to the end customer. In some instances, 
even the brief, temporary loss of electric power can put a gas production, processing, 
compression, or storage facility out of service for long periods of time, especially where 
weather conditions delay access to those facilities [24]. This is difficult to quantify. 
Finally, there is an impact on transmission lines. A 5 °C increase in air temperature 
could decrease transmission line capacity. Estimation in +5 °C scenario suggest a 
decrease  by 7% – 8% [25] which, for a rough and conservative assessment, could imply 
a 2% loss per °C on the electrical energy. 
NET ENERGY BALANCE 
After having analysed the effects of climate change both on energy supply and 
demand, it is now possible to look at the values for each of the elements in the energy 
balance and find out how rooted is the concern for possible threats to the energy security 
in Europe. In order to make the effects on energy balance easier to read, a simplified 
version of the above energy balance is used and all sources together are collapsed in a 
single column. Supply area is split in three macro areas: primary production, net import 
and others. Energy demand is split in: industry, transport and residential + services. The 
total balance is closed with energy transformation, energy management and non energy 
use.  
Breakdown of effects of climate change on energy sector will be the following: 
 Energy supply will not be affected by climate change, extreme weather events 
apart; 
 Transformation will suffer a decrease of efficiency in thermal power plant 
expressed by: 
 
ΔEin  = 0.005 × ΔT × Ein  (2) 
 
Ein is amount of energy to be transformed and ΔT is the temperature change; 
 Electricity distribution will experience an additional loss of energy expressed by: 
 
ΔEel  = 0.02 × ΔT × Eel (3) 
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where Eel is amount of electricity produced and distributed; 













bcc × _CDDacc / CDDbcc (5) 
 
In a +2 °C scenario, the previous assessment applied to the EU27 2010 energy 
balance produces the effects listed in table 4. The green cells highlight values unaffected 
by climate change while the red cells indicate affected values. Overall, a 75 Mtoe 
reduction in energy consumption improves the overall energy balance by 4%. This means 
that, in a +2 °C scenario expected to be far from any tipping point, the issue of energy 
security for Europe will not be exacerbated but possibly alleviated.  
 





















































































 Recovered products + Stock change - Bunkers + Direct use 
3
 (Tranf. input - output) (Main act. and autoprod. of thermal power station + nuclear power stations) 
4
 Briquetting, Coke-oven, Blast-furnace and District heating plants + Gas works + Refineries 
5
 Exchanges and transfers. Returns + Consumption of the energy branch 
CONCLUSION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
Energy demand and supply are going to be modified in Europe as an effect of climate 
change and the possible threat to energy security needs to be discussed in advance. Data 
of EU27 energy balance in 2010 have been analysed and their change in a +2 °C scenario 
has been discussed. There are significant differences among countries but this study 
analyses European data as a whole. Quantitative assessments have been made at the level 
of first order calculation, both for the sake of simplicity and because the great incertitude 
on future scenarios could make a supposed higher resolution meaningless. The main 
findings are: 
Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy, Water  
and Environment Systems 
Year 2015 
Volume 3, Issue 1,  pp 106-117  
 
115 
 More than 60% (industry + transport) of European energy consumption is today 
(2010) climate independent; 
 The remaining 40% of consumption is about households and services. Around 
70% of this share goes in heating while less than 5% goes in cooling. Heating and 
cooling are usually correlated to HDD and CDD which are expected to change in 
-20% HDD and +65% CDD. The net result will be a reduction of 5% in energy 
consumption; 
 On the supply side, an exact picture is much more difficult to depict but effects are 
expected to be small if, overall, not zero. Mining and extraction are expected to be 
climate independent. The only area which could be affected is electricity 
production and distribution. In fact higher temperature means lower efficiency of 
thermal power plants and increase in distribution losses. Combination of the two 
effects results, ceteris paribus, in a decrease of 1-2% in energy availability but the 
energy sector could easily cope with this request of resilience.  
All previous assessments are made without taking into account consequences of 
extreme weather events, which are expected to increase in intensity and frequency but 
whose effects on energy sector can hardly be estimated. Tipping points are also taken out 
of any quantitative assessment. 
The overall picture is that climate change in Europe is not going to pose a dramatic 
challenge to energy security. In fact, the large share of fuel import, more than 70%, will 
remain the biggest threat for decades to come. 
Previous conclusions do not want to underestimate the importance of proactive 
actions to make the energy sector better prepared to adapt to climate changes and top 
priority should be given to improving the power sector’s resilience. Back-up power 
generation, additional peak power capacity, distributed generation, interconnections 
among electric grids and portable generators to critical facilities for possible outages are 
examples of needed actions. Integration among parts is needed in order to maximise 
efficiency and flexibility but extreme weather suggests that making each part able to 
survive any possible disruption is also essential. The World Energy Council (WEC), 
recently compiled a study along with Cambridge University and the European Climate 
Foundation, urging generators to examine their vulnerability to climate change, saying 
that with suitable adaptations the worst of the problems could be avoided. That said, 
given the usual large incertitude on energy forecast aggravated by the intrinsic limits of 
climate models, a part of ‘play it by the ear’ will be unavoidable.  
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